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ABSTRACT
Attribute-based access control makes access control decisions based
on the assigned attributes of subjects and the access policies to pro-
tect objects by mediating operations from the subjects. Authority,
which validates attributes of subjects, is one key component to facil-
itate attribute-based access control. In an increasingly decentralized
society, multiple attributes possessed by subjects may need to be
validated by multiple different authorities. This paper proposes
a multi-authority attribute-based access control scheme by using
Ethereum’s smart contracts. In the proposed scheme, Ethereum
smart contracts are created to define the interactions between data
owner, data user, and multiple attribute authorities. A data user
presents its attributes to different attribute authorities, and after
successful validation of attributes, obtains attribute tokens from
respective attribute authorities. After collecting enough attribute
tokens, a smart contract will be executed to issue secret key to
the data user to access the requested object. The smart contracts
for multi-authority attribute-based access control have been proto-
typed in Solidity, and their performance has been evaluated on the
Rinkeby Ethereum Testnet.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security andprivacy→Access control; Information account-
ability and usage control.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In computer and information security, the mechanism of access
control has been widely used to protect objects from unautho-
rized operations by subjects. Such operations may include creating,
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deleting, discovering, editing, executing, event recording [7], and
reading of objects. Formally, access control mechanisms is defined
as the logical component that serves to receive the access request from
the subject, to decide, and to enforce the access decision [9]. With
access control, owners of objects have the authority to establish
access policies that govern which subjects may perform what op-
erations on the objects. How these access policies are specified
depends on the access control models within which the subjects,
objects, operations, and rules interact to make and enforce access
control decisions. Although each model has its own advantages
and limitations, over time, access control models have evolved from
identity-based to role-based, and to attribute-based.
In general, attribute-based access control makes access control
decisions based on the assigned attributes of subjects and the access
policies (complex Boolean rules evaluating attributes) to protect ob-
jects by mediating operations from the subjects. Broadly speaking,
attribute-based access control has been defined as an access control
method where subject requests to perform operations on objects are
granted or denied based on assigned attributes of the subject, assigned
attributes of the object, environment conditions, and a set of policies
that are specified in terms of those attributes and conditions [9].
To facilitate attribute-based access control, one critical compo-
nent is an authority which validates attributes of the subjects to
make access control decisions. In theory, one attribute authority
(AA) may oversee and validate all the attributes of subjects. How-
ever, in an increasingly decentralized society, there may exist mul-
tiple authorities which take part in validating different attributes
possessed by subjects. For instance, a Delaware resident is a stu-
dent of the University of Delaware and also interns at the DuPont
company. These three attributes must be validated by three differ-
ent authorities, the University of Delaware, Delaware’s Division of
Motor Vehicles, and the DuPont company. As another example of a
commercial application, two banks, such as JP Morgan Chase and
Bank of America, hence two authorities, may both need to validate
respective attributes of people who take part in a joint project.
In this paper, we propose a scheme to facilitate multi-authority
attribute-based access control by using Ethereum smart contracts.
In this scheme, data owner generates a secret key and encrypt the
shared data with the AES algorithm, and keeps the secret key with
himself. Within Ethereum’s smart contracts, a data user presents
attributes to respective authorities to obtain attribute tokens after
successful validation. Upon collecting enough attribute tokens from
multiple attribute authorities, the data user will receive the AES se-
cret key capable of accessing the request data. Our contributions are
mainly two parts: First, we propose the multi-authority attribute-
based access control mechanism by designing smart contracts and
utilizing Ethereum blockchain platform. Second, we implement the
ar
X
iv
:1
90
3.
07
00
9v
4 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
6 S
ep
 20
19
ICBCT 2019, March 15–18, 2019, Honolulu, HI, USA Hao Guo Ehsan Meamari Chien-Chung Shen
attribute token rules to represent the attribute sets and access pol-
icy in traditional attribute-based access control mechanism. With
the design of multiple attribute authorities, we achieve the multi-
authority functionality for our scheme.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2,
backgrounds of Ethereum smart contract and attribute-based access
policy are reviewed. Then, the architecture of smart contract-based
multi-authority access control scheme, and the detailed designs of
smart contracts are presented in Section 3. In Section 4, we evaluate
the costs of executing the smart contracts and analysis the security
and privacy issues. Related work is described in Section 5, and
Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we review the basic concepts of Ethereum with
smart contract and attribute-based access policy.
2.1 Ethereum with Smart Contract
Ethereum is a distributed computing platform featuring the smart
contract functionality [4],[6]. It is proposed in late 2013 by Vita-
lik Buterin, a cryptocurrency researcher and programmer [1]. The
Ethereum development was funded by an online crowdsale event
which took place between July and August 2014, and the official sys-
tem went live on 30 July 2015 [1]. In contrast to Bitcoin-like systems
where transactions are programmed in a simple non-Turing com-
plete scripting language, and can only specify basic logic relations,
which limits their utility to other application domains, Ethereum
smart contract provides an event-driven, Turing complete scripting
functionality to specify and process complex transactions which
can be verified to demonstrate the feasibility of the contract opera-
tion. From the perspective of the smart contract, it works like the a
event-driven script and will automatically execute the script if the
pre-defined logical condition has been satisfied. Before the smart
contract is executed, all related logic functions and processes were
already established.
Within Ethereum, there are two types of accounts: Externally
Owned Accounts (EOA) and Contract Accounts, both of which
are uniquely identified by a 20-byte hexadecimal string as their
address. An EOA is controlled by its owner’s private key, has an
available ether balance, and can send transactions (for instance, send
a message to another account for transferring ether or trigger the
execution of a smart contract). It has no associated code with EOA
account. While a contract account also has an ether balance, but
contains the associated code which can be triggered by a transaction
or from other smart contract.
Ether is the official cryptocurrency used in Ethereum platform.
All the ether balances and values are represented in units of wei:
1 ether is 1e18 wei. The Ethereum platform has a smart contract
running environment, which is known as the Ethereum Virtual
Machine (EVM) [5]. Each mining node in the Ethereum network
(Node receives, broadcast, verifies, and executes the transaction in
Ethereum network) runs EVM as part of the validation procedure
and later perform the same results and store the data. Every opera-
tion in EVM has a specific cost, which is counted by the amount
of gas. The sender of the transaction needs to pay for ether for the
Nonce
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Data
Figure 1: Data structure of an Ethereum transaction.
operations and the total transaction cost is estimated as Ether =
Gas Used * Gas Price.
Figure 2: Ethereum transaction example from etherscan.io.
The Ethereum transaction is a data package which enables user
to transfer ether from one account to another account. In addition,
it can also trigger the execution of the code in the smart contract
through one transaction. Figure 2 and 3 shows the Ethereum trans-
action data structure and one screenshot from the Etherscan web-
site (etherscan.io). One unique Ethereum transaction consists of
the following data field: Nonce, represents for the transaction se-
quence number from the sender. Receiver address, which contains
the receiver account information. Gas price, the price user offer to
pay. Gas limit, maximum amount of gas allowed for one transac-
tion. Amount, the total ether balance transfered to the destination
address. V, R, and S, together makes up the Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for sender’s signature. Data, optional
additional data fields which can be put into any data.
2.2 Attribute-Based Access Policy
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) defines an access control
policy, in which the access rights are granted to users through the
use of access policies which combine attributes together [3]. The ac-
cess policies could use any type of attributes. For instance, subject’s
attribute, object’s attribute, and environment attributes. Access
policy can support the Boolean rule, in which rules contain "IF,
THEN" statements about who is making the request, the resource,
and the action [3]. For example: IF the requester is a University of
Multi-Authority Attribute-Based
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Delaware graduate student, THEN allow the access to the data. The
critical feature of ABAC is the concept of access policies which can
express a complex Boolean rule set that can evaluate many different
attributes [9].
In our solution, we adopt the AND-gate access policy AND∗m ,
which supports multiple values with wildcards * [14]. An access
policyW is a rule which returns either 0 or 1, given an attribute set
S. That is, attribute set S satisfies policyW if and only if W evaluates
to 1 on S. Note that the wildcard * in an AND-gate policy plays the
role of a “don’t care” value. Formally, given an attribute list S = [S1,
S2 , ..., Sn] and an access policyW = [W1,W2 , ...,Wn] =
∧
i ∈IWWi ,
where IW is a subscript index set and IW = {i |1 ≤ i ≤ n,Wi , ∗},
and we say that S |=W if Si =Wi orWi = * for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and S ⊭
W otherwise [14].
Here we present a concrete example. Suppose an data owner in
the Computer and Information Sciences Department at the Univer-
sity of Delaware specifies access policy W to be [UD, PhD Student,
Gender*] for accessing encrypted research meeting notes, and we
have student Alice’s attribute list SAlice = [UD, PhD Student, Fe-
male], and student Bob’s attribute list SBob = [UD, Master Student,
Male]. As a result, Alice can access the corresponding encrypted
research meeting notes, while Bob cannot because he is an Mas-
ter student. Notice that the Gender* attribute indicates that either
gender satisfies the access policy.
3 ARCHITECTURE OF SMART CONTRACT
BASED MULTI AUTHORITY ACCESS
CONTROL
In this section, we describe the architecture of the proposed multi-
authority attribute-based access control scheme based on smart
contracts. By referring to Fig. 3, we first enumerate the following
entities that take part (either actively or passively) in the architec-
ture.
Data Owner (DO) Data User (DU)
Shared Data (SD)
…
                                                                                           AA1                               AA2                             AAk
...
        --- Managed Attribute
        --- Attribute Token
        --- Smart Contract
A
Attribute Authority (AA)
A1 A2 Ai
Figure 3: Proposed system scheme.
• Data Owner (DO): A DO is an entity (e.g., person, organi-
zation, or process) who owns the data to be shared. A DO
actively specifies access policies for the data it shares.
• Data User (DU): A DU is an entity who wants to access data
shared by DOs. A DU actively seeks access authorizations
from DOs.
• Shared Data (SD): An SD is a piece of data owned by a DO,
and can be accessed passively by authorized DUs.
• Attribute Token (AT): An AT is a credential representing an
attribute that a DU possesses.
• Attribute Authority (AA): An AA is a pre-verified and au-
thorized node in Ethereum who issues ATs to qualified DUs
who possess the corresponding attributes.
In the proposed architecture, after a DU has been validated for
possessing a particular set of attributes by an AA, the AA will then
issue the corresponding set of ATs to the DU. This validation pro-
cess is carried out in the context of smart contracts. Consequently,
satisfaction of the access policy associated with an SD is now rep-
resented by the collection of the corresponding ATs. Once a DU
meets the access control policy imposed by the DO of the SD, the
smart contract between the DU and the DO is executed for the DU
to receive the AES secret key (which is encrypted with DU’s public
key) from the DO to access the SD.
Fig. 4 depicts a sample workflow scenario, where a DU, multiple
AAs, and a DO communicate via smart contracts, as defined below,
to perform multi-authority attribute-based access control.
(1) AAs, DO, and DU register their respective EOA accounts
with Ethereum, so that they may participate in Ethereum
blockchain network. (Not shown in Fig. 4.)
(2) Using a standard symmetric encryption algorithm, such as
AES-256, the DO generates a secret key to encrypt the SD,
and uploads the encrypted data to a shared database. In
addition, the DO defines the access policy for the SD and
creates smart contract DO to be executed between itself and
the DU.
(3) A DU creates smart contract RequestAT with each AA,
which contains the function checkA that requests validation
of its attributes, and returns the corresponding ATs upon
successful validation. The DU also creates smart contract
RequestKeywith the DO, which contains function checkAT
that the DU holds enough ATs to send the AES secret key.
(4) AA1 creates a smart contract AT between itself and the DU,
which contains function checkAttribute for validating the
DU’s attributes, and the function sendToken for granting
ATs. Similarly, AA2 creates another smart contract AT be-
tween itself and the DU.
(5) Now, the DUwanting to access the SD executes its smart con-
tract RequestAT to request validation of its attributes by in-
voking function checkA. In turns, checkA triggers the execu-
tion of the smart contractAT by invoking the checkAttribute
function of AT. Upon successful validation, the sendToken
function is invoked to return the associated ATs to be saved
in the “balance” of DU’s EOA account.
(6) After accumulating enough “balance,” the DU will executes
smart contract RequestKey to invoke its function checkAT
for validating its ATs so as to obtain the AES secret key (en-
crypted with DU’s public key) by triggering smart contract
DO and invoking its sendKey function.
(7) At the end, the DU decrypts the AES secret key (which was
encrypted with its public key) with his private key, and uses
the AES secret key to access the SD.
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 DU                                                AA1          AA2                                                                 DO                                                        SD                               
DO encrypts SD using AES algorithm 
and keep the secret key for itself
DO defines the access policy and 
creates a smart contract between 
itself and DU
DU uses the secret key to 
decrypt SD
DU creates smart contracts 
between itself, AAs and DO
AA1 creates a smart contract 
between itself and DU
AA2 creates a smart 
contract between itself and 
DURequestAT
checkA ()
AT
checkAttribute ()
sendToken ()
RequestKey
checkAT ()
DO
verifyAT ()
sendKey ()
Figure 4: Proposed workflow scenario.
The smart contract created by DU between itself and AA:
contract RequestAT {
function checkA(addressOfAA){
AT my_at = AT(addressOfAA);
if (my_at.checkAttribute() == true)
return my_at.sendToken();
return FAILURE;
}
}
The smart contract created by DU between itself and DO:
contract RequestKey {
function checkAT(addressOfDO){
DO my_ap = DO(addressOfDO);
if (my_ap.verifyAT() == true)
return my_ap.sendKey();
return FAILURE;
}
}
The smart contract created by AA between itself and DU:
contract AT is ERC20Interface, Owned{
string public symbol;
string public name;
uint8 public decimals;
mapping(address => uint) balances;
mapping(uint256 => Data) CheckAttribute;
event Sendtoken(address from, address to,
uint tokens);
struct Data{
uint256 AttributeID;
string attribute;
string approve;
}
function AttributeToken() public{
symbol = "UD";
name = "UD Token";
decimals = 0;
totalSupply = 100;
balances [addressOfAA] = totalSupply;
Multi-Authority Attribute-Based
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}
function checkAttribute(uint256
AttributeID, string attribute, string
approve) public returns (bool success){
CheckAttribute[AttributeID] =
Data(AttributeID, attribute, approve);
return true;
}
function sendToken(address to, uint tokens)
public returns (bool success){
require(!frozenAccount[to]);
emit Sendtoken(msg.sender, to, tokens);
return true;
}
}
The smart contracts created by DO between itself and DU:
contract DO {
event Sendkey(address from, address to,
bytes encryptedKey);
event VerifyAT(address to, uint tokens,
bytes approve);
struct AESData{
bytes encryptedKey;
}
function sendKey(address to, bytes
encryptedKey) public returns (bool
success){
emit Sendkey (msg.sender, to,
encryptedKey);
return true;
}
function verifyAT(address from, address
to, uint tokens, bytes approve)
public returns (bool success){
allowed [to][from] = tokens;
require(balanceOf(to) >=
balanceOf(from));
emit VerifyAT(to, tokens, approve);
return true;
}
}
Smart contracts provide the benefits of authentication, autho-
rization, and audit as follows. First, when DO or DU executes a
transaction, authentication is guaranteed since only the legitimate
DO and DU accounts are able to initiate transactions. Second, the
authorization is achieved by adopting ATs granted from multiple
AAs to the DU if the DU has valid attributes, and later DO could
check the ATs provided by the DU to determine if the DU satisfies
the access policy or not. Third, by adopting the inherent design of
blockchain, every transaction’s record has been stored permanently
and it’s easy for people to audit the transaction information in fu-
ture. In the end, each DU and DO has its own public and private
keys, any attacker with no prior knowledge of the user’s private
key cannot decrypt the data send between DO and DU.
Overall, these smart contracts deploy the proposed scenarios as
we described before. We implement the proof of concept prototype
to illustrate the feasibility of our designed smart contracts and
evaluate the experimental result in next section.
4 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND
SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we evaluate the creation cost of smart contracts
and the execution cost of their respective functions that facilitate
multi-authority attribute-based access control via experiments on
the Rinkeby Ethereum Testnet.
4.1 Experiment Setting
The smart contracts presented in the last section were programmed
in Solidity [10] by using the official on-line IDE Remix. In the month
of October 2018, 1 ether ≈ 205 US$. In our experiments, 1 gas = 1e9
ether, which is the minimum transaction cost. The lower the gas
value, the longer time a transaction will be validated by miners,
and vice versa.
4.2 Results
The costs of smart contract creations and their respective function
executions are presented in Table 1. As we can observe from the
table, the one-time costs of smart contract creation for RequestAT,
ResquestKey, and AT are 0.232, 0.208 and 0.359 US$, respectively,
based on the current price of ether. In comparison, the cost of
function executions is relatively low. Note that the execution costs
of these functions vary based on the different input lengths such as
the attribute information and other related data.
Experiment Results
Contract/Function Gas Used Cost(ether) USD ($)
RequestAT (C) 1132452 0.001132452 0.232
RequestKey (C) 1022644 0.001022644 0.208
AT (C) 1752958 0.001752958 0.359
checkAttribute (F) 394286 0.000394286 0.080
sendToken (F) 123680 0.000123680 0.025
verifyAT (F) 356070 0.000356070 0.073
sendKey (F) 224520 0.000224520 0.046
Table 1: Cost of smart contracts and functions.
4.3 Security Analysis
In our proposed scheme, we integrate the Ethereum smart con-
tract, multi-authority attribute-based access control policy, and
AES mechanism to provide a robust and privacy-preserving system.
First, data owners fully control their personal data and there is
no third-party authority to collect the information from the data
owner. They have the right to distribute AES secret key to qualified
data user. Second, in our solution, we utilize the multiple attribute
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authorities to avoid possible collusion and single point of failure.
Since each attribute authority only responsible for certain number
of attribute tokens, the attribute tokens reliability and availability is
highly secured. Last, we use the Ethereum’s blockchain platform to
perform communications among different participants, which saves
all the data records and transaction information. If later people like
to trace back certain information, it will be easy to provide the data
provenance records due to the character of blockchain technology.
5 RELATEDWORK
Several efforts have been done to provide the access control mech-
anism with the help of blockchain-based technologies. Maesa et
al. [8] proposes a solution to publish policies specifying the rights
to access resources, and demonstrated a potential implementation
based on deploying the eXtensible Access Control Markup Languag
(XACML) [13] on a Bitcoin blockchain network. Cruz et al. [5] de-
scribes a role-based access control scheme using smart contracts,
which is composed of two parts, the smart contracts to represent
the trust and endorsement relationship and the challenge-response
protocol to verify user identity. AI-Bassam et al. [2] proposes the
SCPKI (A Smart Contract-based PKI and Identity System), which is
an PKI system based on a decentralized design using the web-of-
trust model and a smart contract. The web-of-trust model enables
an entity or authority in the system can verify attributes of another
entity’s identity (such as company name or domain name), as an
alternative solution to the centralized authority identity verifica-
tion model. Uchibeke et al. [11] proposed blockchain-based access
control ecosystem which gives asset owners the sovereign right to
manage access control for data sets and protect the data integrity.
They use the Hyperledger composer tool to implement the smart
contracts and other functions deployed on the blockchain network.
Westerkamp et al. [12] presents a blockchain-based supply chain
traceability system using smart contracts. In their mechanism, each
manufacturer defines the composition of products in the form of
recipes, and each ingredient of the recipe is a non-fungible token
which corresponds to a physical good. Overall, this system pre-
serves the traceability of different product transformations.
In our work, we propose the multi-authority attribute-based
access control scheme by using smart contract. Additionally, by
utilizing the ERC-20 token standards and other functionalities pro-
vided by the solidity language, we map each unique attribute to
attribute token to represent the requirement of access policy and
other event-driven function to achieve the desired goal.
6 CONCLUSION
Our increasingly decentralized society motivates the need of mul-
tiple authorities to take part in attribute-based access control. In
this paper, we propose a multi-authority attribute-based access
control mechanism. The interactions among data users, data own-
ers, and multiple authorities are programmed into Ethereum smart
contracts. We describe the architecture and operational workflow
of multi-authority attribute-based access control. As a proof of
concept, the scheme is programmed in Solidity and tested on the
Rinkeby Ethereum Testnet.
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